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No-deal	Brexit:	the	biggest	test	yet	for	UK	crisis
management?
How	should	the	government	prepare	for	a	no-deal	Brexit?	Until	now,	DExEU	has
been	reluctant	to	communicate	its	activities	to	the	public.	John	Connolly
(University	of	the	West	of	Scotland)	and	Andrew	Judge	(University	of
Glasgow)	explain	why	co-ordinated	planning	across	government	departments,
and	clear	communication	with	the	public,	are	vital.
The	news	that	the	UK	and	EU	are	stepping	up	their	preparations	for	a	‘no	deal’
Brexit	has	attracted	predictable	responses	from	Remainers	and	Brexiteers.	Most	Remainers	view	the	decision	as	a
belated	vindication	of	their	worst	fears	about	leaving	the	EU.	Brexiteers	are	somewhat	more	divided.	Some	consider
the	European	Commission’s	decision	to	issue	guidance	documents	as	the	latest	manifestation	of	Project	Fear.
Others,	such	as	Jacob	Rees-Mogg,	have	long	called	for	the	UK	to	make	similar	preparations	to	demonstrate	to	the
EU	that	the	UK	is	serious	about	preferring	‘no	deal’	over	a	‘bad	deal’,	as	the	Prime	Minister	affirmed	in	her	Lancaster
House	speech.
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While	somewhat	overstated,	these	fears	shouldn’t	be	ignored.	The	identification	of	risks	and	the	development	plans
to	mitigate	them	are	inherently	political	choices.	Moreover,	contingency	plans	are	in	some	senses	‘fantasy
documents’	which	serve	as	“rationality	badges,	symbols	[that]	organisations	use	to	signal	they	are	in	control	of
danger,	whether	they	really	are	or	not”.
Nonetheless,	the	announcement	that	plans	are	being	put	in	place	should	still	be	welcomed	as	sensible	and	prudent
under	such	uncertain	circumstances.	Regardless	of	your	views	on	Brexit,	it	is	becoming	increasingly	likely	(but
not	inevitable)	that	the	UK	will	leave	the	EU	without	a	withdrawal	agreement.	It	is	also	hard	to	dispute	that	such	an
outcome	would	have	a	range	of	immediately	negative	consequences	for	both	the	UK	and	EU	on	the	first	day	of
‘taking	back	control’.	It	would	be	wholly	irresponsible	of	the	UK,	European	Commission	and	EU27	governments	to
not	plan	for	such	eventualities.
We	should	perhaps	be	reassured	by	the	recent	statement	from	the	acting	Cabinet	Secretary,	Sir	Mark	Sedwill,	to	the
Public	Administration	and	Constitutional	Affairs	Committee	on	19	July:
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“We	have	confidence	in	our	‘no	deal’	planning	[…]	and	we	have	a	whole	range	of	mechanisms,	some	of
them	designed	over	many	years	for	different	circumstances	that	we	can	apply,	should	that	be	the	case,
against	a	range	of	no	deal	scenarios.	I	wouldn’t	want	any	of	our	partners	to	think	that	we	won’t	be	ready
for	it”.
The	mechanisms	he	refers	are	likely	to	be	of	two	broad	types.	The	first	are	the	contingency	plans	which	the	UK
already	has	in	place	for	managing	crises	across	different	policy	areas	such	as	health,	energy	and	environmental
policy.	These	plans	take	many	forms,	but	they	typically	outline	the	range	of	actions	that	need	to	be	taken	and
allocate	roles	and	responsibilities	for	coordination,	implementation	and	communication	functions	during	a	crisis.
While	Brexit	is	not	an	eventuality	that	is	explicitly	planned	for	within	these	plans,	they	nonetheless	set	out	a
framework	for	dealing	with	unforeseen	and	extreme	circumstances.
The	second	mechanism	are	the	new	contingency	plans	which	the	UK	will	have	to	develop	to	address	the	particular
challenges	that	are	likely	to	emerge	from	a	‘no	deal’	Brexit	such	as	delays	at	customs,	uncertainties	about
regulations	over	data	sharing	and	so	on.
Unfortunately,	not	everyone	shares	Sir	Mark’s	confidence.	At	the	same	Select	Committee	meeting	the	chief
executive	of	the	Civil	Service,	John	Manzoni,	stressed	that	although	contingency	plans	are	being	put	in	place,	“not
everything	will	be	perfect”	if	a	‘no	deal’	scenario	occurs.	The	response	of	Hilary	Benn,	the	chair	of	the	Brexit	Select
Committee,	to	a	question	put	to	him	on	the	Today	programme	about	the	preparedness	of	government	departments	is
even	less	reassuring.	He	stated	that	‘we	just	don’t	know’	whether	government	is	ready	to	manage	such	a	scenario,
and	that	he	felt	that	the	Prime	Minister’s	appearance	before	the	Liaison	Committee	the	day	before	did	not	provide
nearly	enough	clarity	about	this.
These	are	two	main	ways	of	interpreting	these	competing	statements.	It	may	be	that	the	committee	is	not	aware	of
whether	the	Department	for	Exiting	the	European	Union	(DExEU)	is	undertaking	sufficient	contingency	planning.
Since	DExEU	has	reportedly	been	designated	as	the	lead	department	for	coordinating	the	contingency	planning	of	all
departments,	this	is	rather	concerning.	On	the	other	hand,	a	lack	of	preparedness	also	speaks	to	a	fundamental	truth
about	a	‘no	deal’	scenario:	we	are	entering	totally	uncharted	territory.	While	the	main	risks	can	be	identified	and
planned	for	in	advance,	there	are	major	uncertainties	about	unforeseen	risks	and	how	different	risks	may	interact
with	each	other.	While	contingency	planning	is	always	challenging,	it	is	especially	difficult	in	this	kind	of	extreme
situation	and	represents	the	single	greatest	test	of	the	UK’s	crisis	management	capabilities	to	date.
So	how	should	the	government	prepare	for	‘no	deal’?		In	our	view,	there	are	two	key	areas	that	the	government
needs	to	focus	on	in	the	months	ahead.
The	first	is	to	develop	robust	mechanisms	for	the	coordination	of	crisis	response.	In	most	pre-existing	contingency
plans	(the	first	mechanism	discussed	above)	there	is	a	system	of	response	escalation.	The	relevant	department	(e.g.
Health,	BEIS)	typically	takes	the	lead	role	in	the	first	instance,	and	works	with	the	Civil	Contingencies	Secretariat	in
the	Cabinet	Office	as	required.	In	the	most	extreme	circumstances	that	require	a	political	response,	crises	are
typically	elevated	to	the	Cabinet	Office	(the	infamous	COBRA).	This	segregation	of	response	could	mean	that	many
parts	of	a	‘no	deal’	scenario	could	be	managed	by	different	parts	of	government,	thereby	preventing	the	Cabinet
Office	being	overstretched.
It	does,	however,	raise	the	question	of	whether	coordination	between	COBRA	and	different	departments	will	be
sufficient	if	our	worst	fears	are	realised	on	day	one	of	Brexit.	For	instance,	if	customs	problems	lead	to	shortages	in
key	goods	such	as	medicines,	food	and	energy,	how	will	these	intersecting	problems	be	managed?		What	are	the
current	capacities	for	ensuring	an	effective	cross-sectoral	crisis	response	in	such	unprecedented	circumstances?	
What	happens	if	the	UK	faces	crises	unrelated	to	Brexit	at	the	same	time,	such	as	severe	flooding	or	terrorist
attacks?		Can	there	be	effective	crisis	management	leadership	if	there	is	a	simultaneous	political	crisis	within	the
governing	Conservative	party?		These	worst-case-scenarios,	as	unlikely	as	they	may	be,	should	factor	into	any
sensible	contingency	planning.
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The	second,	which	is	closely	related	to	coordination,	is	effective	communication.	Throughout	the	negotiation	process,
DExEU	has	been	quite	reluctant	to	communicate	what	it	is	doing	to	either	the	public	or	Parliament.	This	is
understandable	considering	its	role	in	negotiating	with	the	European	Commission,	but	in	its	new	additional	role	of
coordinating	contingency	planning	it	needs	to	recognise	that	a	key	task	of	crisis	preparations	is	communication.
Effective	communication	is	important	for	providing	reassurance	to	the	public	and	ensuring	that	households	and
businesses	are	well	prepared	in	order	to	minimise	the	negative	consequences	of	a	‘no	deal’	scenario.	The
government’s	commitment	to	produce	and	circulate	70	‘technical	papers’	for	the	public	and	businesses	is	to	be
welcomed,	but	it	is	important	that	these	are	communicated	in	a	timely	manner	and	that	they	contain	useful
information	about	what	is	and	is	not	required.	This	is	vital	for	reassuring	the	public	and	avoiding	the	kind	of	alarmist
statements	that	have	appeared	in	the	media	in	recent	days	and	any	accusations	that	they	are	simply	‘fantasy
documents’.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Dr	John	Connolly	is	a	Reader	in	Public	Policy	at	the	University	of	the	West	of	Scotland.
Dr	Andrew	Judge	is	a	Lecturer	in	International	Relations	at	the	University	of	Glasgow.	They	are	both	currently
undertaking	a	research	project	funded	by	the	Carnegie	Trust	for	the	Universities	of	Scotland	on	the	impact	of	Brexit
on	UK	crisis	governance	for	health	and	energy	security.
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